By focusing across multiple species and not just humans, Bergmann (1848) had a large body of comparative data with which to formulate his ideas on the relationship of size to temperature and latitude. The data published by Tiedemann (1837) and Morton (1849) are limited to humans, but nonetheless comprised individuals from over 60° north and 40° south. In theory, they might also have asked if the patterns noticed by Bergmann were evident in their own data. However, unlike Bergmann, Tiedemann and Morton were preoccupied with debates about human racial superiority. Indeed, recent authors (e.g., Gould 1978, 1996; Michael 1988; Kaplan et al. 2015; Weisberg and Paul 2016; Mitchell 2018; Mitchell and Michael 2019; Bogin et al. 2022) have also been preoccupied by the social context of human data. To their credit, Lewis et al. (2011), in their critique of Gould (1978, 1996), acknowledged previous work showing a relation between cranial capacity and latitude (Beals et al. 1984), as did Lieberman (2001). However, they still focused on the implications of racism and investigator bias surrounding interpretations of human craniometric data. Whether or not the data published by Tiedemann (1837) and Morton (1849) reflect patterns of latitudinal variation in humans remains unknown. Here, I attempt to fill this gap by asking if the data collected by Tiedemann (1837) and Morton (1849) contained a signal supportive of Bergmann’s pattern. Manica et al. (2007) sampled a much larger dataset, in turn derived from Hanihara and Ishida (2001, 2005). For comparison, I ask if it too reflects Bergmann’s pattern.

Asking if 19th-century investigators could have noticed a pattern in their data does not require re-hashing the copious literature (e.g., Beals et al. 1984; Ashton et al. 2000; Meiri and Dayan 2003; Freckleton et al. 2003; Relethford 2004, 2010; Foster and Collard 2013; Katz et al. 2016; He et al. 2023; Ocobock 2023) on the extent to which cold temperatures, typical of high latitudes, are causally linked to evolutionary increase in size. Nor does it require the assumption that climate is the only or even primary influence. There are many potential factors behind phenotypic change (e.g., Relethford 2010; Mori et al. 2019; Gigliotti et al. 2020 and others as cited above) and most species will probably be subject to multiple such factors over time.

Some previous investigations of human cranial (e.g., Roseman 2016) and postcranial (Savell et al. 2022) form have emphasized the importance of population structure in interpreting correlations between latitude and phenotype. These authors identified some skeletal variables that were significantly correlated with a climatic gradient, but still emphasized the role of neutral evolution behind variation in the modern human skeleton. A study focusing on postcranial indices of stature (Pomeroy et al. 2021) also emphasized neutral changes inherent in population history, but still supported a significant relation between climate and body proportions, in particular that environmental productivity (their “net primary productivity” [NPP]) and “temperature are generally the most consistent predictors” of the anthropometric indices they examined (Pomeroy et al. 2021: 11). Katz et al. (2016) focused specifically on human cranial variation, used methods to account for population history, and similarly concluded that climate had a significant affect on phenotype: “cold climate groups tend toward larger crania ... [Our] results are consistent with earlier descriptions of increased brachycephaly (higher cephalic indices) in cold-climate groups (Beals 1972). ... [B]oth size and shape changes are associated with climate differences” (Katz et al. 2016: 597).

While there are qualifications, recent studies focusing on explicit datasets sampling both human and non-human species remain generally consistent with Beals et al. (1984), and ultimately Bergmann (1848), in support of an association between climate and size. Moreover, a role for thermal efficiency does not contradict the observation that “evolution of the human cranium is complex and no one evolutionary process has prevailed at the expense of all others” (Roseman 2016: 582). Here, I do not attempt to reevaluate the causal basis of Bergmann’s pattern, or discern the relative importance of the many factors that could have played a role in patterning the data collected by Tiedemann (1837) and Morton (1849), if indeed there are any non-random patterns at all. Instead, I address the latter question: is there a non-random signal present in the data collected by these 19th-century authors which, in turn, could have led them to notice clinal variation in humans?

If contemporary methods show no association of size with latitude in their data, then neither Morton nor Tiedemann would have had an evidential basis to consider factors such as those articulated by Bergmann, or look beyond a presumed relation between cranial capacity and intelligence. Alternatively, if their data do exhibit a size–latitude correlation, this would suggest that biological patterns are still discoverable in datasets collected nearly 200 years ago, despite the very different social and political standards of the naturalists who assembled them. At least in Morton’s case, this would contradict the assertion of Kaplan et al. (2015: 22) who “challenge[d] the premise ... that Morton’s confused data can be used to draw any meaningful conclusions.” Historical data have intrinsic value, and the assessment of such data enables current generations to better appreciate how our predecessors understood humanity’s place in nature.

Cranial capacities published by Tiedemann (1837) and Morton (1849) increase along with latitude in the northern but not southern hemisphere (Figure 1A; Table 1), a result similar to that reported by Foster and Collard (2013). Indeed, Morton’s data show the reverse trend in the southern hemisphere, albeit with just one skull over 40° south and 14 between 30° and 40° south. The positive correlation of cranial capacity and latitude in the northern hemisphere using global data from both datasets is significant using non-parametric, rank-based (Table 1) and Mantel (Table 2) tests. There is no correlation between latitude and size for the Tiedemann data in the southern hemisphere, and a significant, inverse correlation for Morton’s data using either his own measurements or re-measurements of the same skulls by Lewis et al. (2011). Re-measurements from Lewis et al. (2011) recover a similarly significant, positive correlation for Morton’s data in the northern hemisphere (Table 1).

Decomposing the sample further into the two longitudinally widest, habitable regions (the Americas and Africa-Europe) revealed two departures from the pooled samples. First, the Tiedemann sample in North America (13° to 64°) showed no trend in cranial capacities with increasing latitudes (Figure 1B). Second, Tiedemann showed an upward, non-significant trend for cranial capacities with increasing latitude in South America (-7° to -39°; Figure 1B) when considered separately from the downward trend evident in the rest of the world (Figure 1C; Table 1).

I also tested if cranial volume correlates with seasonality and mean annual temperatures. Again, individual skulls were averaged so that each degree of latitude contributed one mean cranial capacity, one mean annual temperature, and one index of seasonality. The Tiedemann dataset shows significant correlations of cranial size with both; i.e., cranial capacity increases as seasonal changes in temperature increase, and as annual mean temperatures decrease (Figure 2; Table 1). The Morton dataset shows the same trends, but with datapoints averaged for each degree of latitude, and using either Morton’s own measurements or re measurements from Lewis et al. (2011), neither seasonality nor mean temperature is significantly correlated with cranial capacity (Table 1).

Using a contingency table with categories defined by median cranial size in the top or bottom 50% and latitude above or below ±45°, both Tiedemann (1837) and Morton (1849) show larger medians among the localities positioned at higher latitudes (Figure 3). Of the 17 localities in the Morton dataset at latitudes above 45°, 14 have median cranial volumes in the top half of the size range and three in the bottom half. Of the 77 localities at or below 45° latitude (north or south), 41 have medians in the bottom half and 36 in the top. For Tiedemann, 37 localities above 45° are in the top half of his size range and 17 are in the bottom. Between 45° north and 45° south of the equator, 23 median cranial volumes are in the top half and 42 are in the bottom. These patterns depart significantly from the null hypothesis of no relationship between latitude and cranial volume using either chi-squared or Fisher’s exact tests (Table 3).

Data from Manica et al. (2007) also suggest that humans associated with higher latitudes tend to have larger cranial volumes (Figure 3C, Figure 4), represented by maximum length x breadth x height (as described in Appendix 2). Again, the signal from the southern hemisphere is weaker than in the north, significant according to a Mantel test (Table 2) but not Kendall’s rank correlation (Table 1). Focusing on males (as the Manica dataset lacks females at the highest southern latitudes), data from Manica are more exclusively partitioned than those from Tiedemann and Morton. There are 30 medians in the top half of the size range over ±45° and three between +45° and -45°. There are 50 medians in the bottom half between +45° and -45° and 22 above ±45°. As with the Tiedemann and Morton datasets, this distribution departs significantly from the null hypothesis of no relationship between latitude and cranial volume (Table 3).

Accordingly, cranial volumes grouped by latitude show increasing trend lines with distance from the equator (Figure 4), with the sample consisting of 50 means (one per degree latitude) representing 3609 skulls from the northern hemisphere and 18 means representing 1057 skulls from the southern hemisphere and equator. Using Kendall’s rank-based test, the correlation of mean cranial volume among males with latitude is significant in the northern but not southern hemisphere (Table 1); using a Mantel test, the correlation is significant in both hemispheres (Table 2).

As noted in Appendix 2 (with raw data provided in Appendix 3), the Manica et al. (2007) dataset, derived in turn from Hanihara and Ishida (2001, 2005), listed one or more localities for each of the populations associated with their 6245 skulls, rather than identifying one locality per skull. The localities were often singular or adjacent, but in some cases could be geographically far apart. For example, they identified 209 male and 139 female skulls from “Peru” and assigned all of them a latitude of −5°. However, the localities listed under “Peru” range from −18° to −8°, from Arica (in modern Chile) to Chicama. The most extreme example of geographically distant localities within one population was for “Chile”, which consisted of 16 male skulls all assigned a single latitude of −50°, but with localities ranging from “Navarin Island” (−55°) to “Iquique” (−20°).

Here, I replaced the latitudes provided by Manica et al. (2007) with the median of the localities associated with each of their populations (Appendix 3). I also undertook resampling experiments for Chile and Peru. Chile has by far the widest range (35°) of reported latitudes among its 12 localities; Peru has a smaller range (10°) but the largest number of localities (14). By randomly assigning specific latitudes corresponding to localities given by Manica et al. (2007) with individual male skulls, using 5000 replicates for each country and another 5000 for the two combined, I sought to determine how the significance values of the resulting correlation coefficients would change.

These randomizations reduced the p values derived from correlation tests relative to the use of medians (Figure 5). While most of the 15000 replicates remained above the significance level of 0.05 for Kendall’s Tau (Figure 5A), nearly all (99%) dropped far below the p value of 0.4543 (Table 1) derived from single medians for each population. Using Pearson’s R (which assumes a normal distribution), all of the 5000 replicates of skulls with localities in Peru resulted in p values under 0.05, as did 80% of the 5000 replicates for Chile and 91% of the replicates in the two combined. Nearly all of these 15000 resamples were below the non-significant p value of 0.103 for Pearson’s R based on single median latitudes for the Chile and Peru populations (Figure 5B).

A reason for a weak signal in the southern hemisphere is the fact that the habitable, high-latitude south is tiny compared to that of the north. The only groups sampled over 43° south are Fuegians and Chileans, compared to 35 such groups over 43° in the northern hemisphere. Accordingly, without data from the Americas (Figure 4C), the southern hemisphere trendline for cranial volume is relatively flat, with no clear changes according to latitude. In addition, the Manica dataset lacks skulls from low latitudes (ca. 0–25°) in the Americas, and the Americans with the largest mean cranial volume are Seminoles (associated with the southeastern USA), with a median latitude of just 28° north. This reduces the slope of the best-fit line in the American northern hemisphere (Figure 4B) relative to that for the rest of the world (Figure 4A). The correlation between latitude and cranial volume for the American north is still positive, but lacks statistical significance.

Both datasets published in the 19th century have a much smaller sample of high-latitude, southern individuals compared to the Manica dataset, which is itself limited by the small number of habitable, high southern latitudes compared to those in the north. The most southerly locality present in Tiedemann and Morton was Tasmania (42.9° south). Only two other Tiedemann individuals (from New Zealand) and none from Morton exceeded 40° south. Just 24 of 880 skulls (3%) in the 19th-century datasets were from localities over 30° south, in contrast to 356 (40%) over 30° and 312 (34%) over 40° degrees north. Distinct results from north vs. south are consistent with Foster and Collard (2013: 13), who report that “unless a region spans more than 50 degrees of latitude or has a range of mean annual temperature in excess of 30°C, it is unlikely that a correlation between body size and latitude/mean annual temperature is reliable evidence for ... Bergmann’s rule.” In both the Morton and Tiedemann datasets, only North American and Asian localities show differences in annual maximum vs. minimum temperatures in excess of 30°, and only the northern hemisphere is sampled by more than 50° latitude.

The Manica dataset also has fewer individuals from the south compared to the north, and is furthermore male biased, as all of the skulls from >50° south are male. Nonetheless, for males at any locality worldwide, the “Fuegian Patagonian” median cranial volume is the largest (Figure 3C).

The goal of this study is to test if data on human cranial capacity from Tiedemann (1837) and Morton (1849) reflect patterns evident in more recent publications (e.g., Beals et al. 1984; Gustafsson and Lindenfors 2009; Katz et al. 2016), in which size correlates with latitude. This in turn might have led these 19th-century investigators to consider the latitude–body size mechanism articulated by Bergmann. With some caveats, data from both Morton and Tiedemann show a correlation between size and latitude.

Neither 19th-century investigator had adequate samples from the southern hemisphere to have been able to recognize latitudinal gradients there (cf. Foster and Collard 2013). However, both had sufficient samples from the north to show a significant, upward trending pattern of cranial capacity with increasing latitude, although this would not have been evident to Tiedemann had he examined his American samples alone (Figure 1B). Based on these 19th-century measurements of human skulls, it would have been difficult, but still possible, to recognize at least some aspects of increasing size with distance from the equator, as articulated by Bergmann. Data from both Tiedemann and Morton exhibited increasing cranial capacities with increasing northern latitudes (Figure 1; Table 1 and Table 2), with larger crania disproportionately represented among higher latitudes (Figure 3, Table 3). Both datasets also tended to associate larger cranial capacities with localities showing lower average temperatures and more disparate extremes of seasonal temperatures (Figure 2), although non-parametric, rank-based tests showed significant relationships only for the Tiedemann dataset (Table 1).

It is worth considering the context in which Tiedemann undertook his investigation, and point out ways in which he differed from contemporaries such as Samuel Morton. Tiedemann (1837) started his monograph noting the relevance of comparative anatomy to debates in the British parliament concerning the slave trade, and made no secret of his antipathy to slavery. He included numerous tables of raw data and summaries thereof, all of which are meant to answer two questions he set out in his introduction: “I) Is the brain of [sub-Saharan Africans] different from that of Europeans? II) Is the brain of [sub-Saharan Africans] more similar to that of [Pongo pygmaeus] than Europeans?” Phrasing research questions in this way is of course offensive today, but it would be unfair to impose our standards on a naturalist writing over 180 years ago. Tiedemann analyzed not only hundreds of skulls, but also 65 human cadavers of European origin and a number of juvenile and infant skulls, with which he made comparisons to the few sub-Saharan African cadavers he had. Regarding actual brain weights (augmenting his approximations thereof based on cranial capacity; see Tobias 1970), Tiedemann wrote (1837: 20) “the claim of many naturalists and anatomists that [sub-Saharan Africans] have smaller brains than Europeans can under no circumstances be regarded as proven”. Regarding comparisons of soft-tissue morphology, Tiedemann wrote (1837: 55) “... the spinal cord of the [sub-Saharan African] Honore ... shows no major differences from that of the European. ... [His] cerebellum is in its outer form, sulci, divisions and lobes completely equivalent to that of the European”. Tiedemann (1837: 61) also disputed a claim that sub-Saharan Africans had thicker cranial nerves.

Tiedemann did not claim that all aspects of human brain morphology were identical across the groups he examined. Concerning the four brains of individuals from sub-Saharan Africa at his disposal, he wrote that the “sulci and gyri of both hemispheres of the cerebrum ... exhibited a more symmetrical arrangement than what one tends to perceive from the brain of Europeans” (1837: 59), but expressed doubt that this was a consistent feature (1837: 63). As pointed out by Richards (2018), Tiedemann also acknowledged a more frequent occurrence of unusually large cranial capacities among his “Caucasian” and “Malay” samples. Foreshadowing Gould’s discussion of population differences some 150 years later (see below), Tiedemann was aware of allometry and suggested differences in overall stature were behind differences in cranial data. Overall, Tiedemann accurately expressed an anatomical basis for his conviction that human brains were essentially similar in their anatomy and not derived from distinct species.

However, he referred to latitude in his text only once (1837: 50) to orient his discussion of variation among African populations. Nowhere does he mention the pattern, subtle but evident in his own data, that skulls from high Eurasian latitudes tended to have larger cranial capacities than those from low latitudes (Figure 1, Figure 3A), and relatedly that those from cooler, more seasonal parts of the world tended to be larger (Figure 2; Table 1). He also did not recognize that his own measurements of 141 European cranial volumes were, on average, significantly larger than the 35 he had from sub-Saharan Africa (Table 4A).

Tiedemann wrote a decade before Bergmann (1848), considered soft tissues as well as skulls, took allometry into consideration, and discovered that human brains are very similar despite the different geographic origins of their owners. For his time, Tiedemann was a visionary. His approach underscores a willingness to explore socially divisive questions with data he thought relevant from the natural world, and he did not shy away from conclusions that would have been unpopular for his time (Richards 2018). He can hardly be faulted for not getting everything right about craniometric variation. Nonetheless, his focus on the sociocultural implications of “race” appears to have precluded discovery of geographic differences that were at least partly evident in his own data.

Samuel Morton’s 1849 book consisted almost entirely of a list of 1512 human skulls (514 of which had sufficient metadata to be sampled here), with “F.A.” (facial angle) and “I.C.” (internal capacity, measured in cubic inches) for most, along with details on their identity and origins. The only substantial text consists of about five pages in his introduction. Morton ignored soft-tissue anatomy, focused only on cranial capacity with its implications for brain size, assumed that larger equaled more intelligent and did not consider relative size (in contrast to Tiedemann). Morton’s mistaken generalizations were published in his earlier work, such as his view that human ethnic groups were of independent origins (see Richards 2018: 154). Like Tiedemann, Morton also attempted to apply insights from the natural world to social questions of his time; he too missed the correlation of increasing size with latitude in the northern hemisphere (Figure 1 and Figure 3; Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3).

Morton’s actual measurements of cranial volumes contradicted the conclusions about cranial size across human groups often attributed to him. His samples were limited, with just 21 crania from sub-Saharan Africa and 37 from Europe (Appendix 3), but his own measurements showed no significant difference between the two groups (Table 4B). The much larger sample of Manica et al. (2007) included 631 crania from sub-Saharan Africa and 1092 from Europe. These and most other continentally-defined human populations differ significantly in skull size, and European crania are significantly larger than those from other regions except for Asia, east Asia, and north Africa (Table 4C).

Although cranial size and shape exhibit developmental plasticity, many aspects of cranial anatomy are heritable (Relethford 2004), and brain size shows evolutionary variation throughout Mammalia (Mace et al. 1981; Burger et al. 2019). This variation has implications for the evolution of at least some aspects of “intelligence” (Van Valen 1974), and there are indeed correlations of physical traits with performance on intelligence tests, including brain volume (Ritchie et al. 2015) and myopia (Williams et al. 2017). There are also differences between human sexes in the density of neural connections and cortical size variation, correlated at least partly with fetal exposure to sex hormones (Gilmore et al. 2018; Baron-Cohen 2020). However, osteological cranial capacity is not a straightforward representation of brain mass (Tobias 1970) and some of history’s most intellectually gifted humans had below-average brain weights (Witelson et al. 1999). Furthermore, the close correlation of stature with brain size (Tobias 1970; Beals et al. 1984; Skullerud 1985) means that, in absolute terms, heavyweight professional wrestlers will on average have larger brains than mathematicians, as will Pleistocene compared to modern humans (Henneberg 1988), or males compared to females. These observations suggest that raw cranial capacity, within the overall range known for humans, is not a consistent indicator of “intelligence”.

The preoccupation with cranial variation among human populations and its supposed relation to intelligence and sociocultural value has persisted in the scientific literature well beyond the 19th century, although a few investigators did investigate climatic factors (e.g., Thomson 1913; Roberts 1954; Coon 1955). Probably the most influential critique of human craniometrics was Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man, first published in 1981, reprinted in 1996, and preceded by Gould’s 1978 article in Science on Samuel Morton. Gould (1978, 1996) argued that Morton (1839, 1849) was biased in arguing for larger brain size among Europeans over other human groups, according to the dominant prejudices of his time (Richards 2018). As Gould observed, Morton’s work was used throughout the 19th century to justify white supremacy. Gould scrutinized how Morton (1839, 1849) presented his data, and found his work to be a “patchwork of fudging and finagling” (1996: loc. 1323). However, Gould’s work has in turn been evaluated to reveal his own bias (Michael 1988; Lewis et al. 2011; Richards 2018; see also Mitchell 2018), which Gould partly acknowledged in a footnote to his 1996 reprint (1996: loc. 8218).

Gould lauded Tiedemann’s argument for racial equality, which for both meant demonstrating similarity among human ethnic groups, and noted (Gould 1996: loc. 1752) an old critique of Tiedemann: the imprecision of millet seeds to measure cranial capacity. Gould reasoned that given more- (seed) and less- (metal shot) error-prone means of measuring cranial capacity, differences between the two showed that Morton underestimated the capacities of African crania more than those of other groups (see Weisberg and Paul 2016).

However, there are several mistakes in Gould’s conclusions. Firstly, an assistant of Morton made the relevant seed measurements, not Morton, which were in any event scrapped when Morton became suspicious of the errors (Richards 2018: 173). Secondly, Mitchell (2018) noted that Morton’s skulls measured for the 1849 book with shot were probably not the same those measured for the 1839 book with seed, and that “errors in the seed measurements were significant, but likely random” (Mitchell 2018: 7). In other words, they were not distributed in such a way as to portray sub-Saharan Africans with unduly small cranial capacities.

Morton did project his assumptions about ethnicity on at least some of his data. For example, and as noted by Gould (1996: loc. 8412), he apparently used large size as a criterion to group certain Egyptian skulls as “Pelasgic” (i.e., of Greek ancestry). Such specimens do indeed have a significantly larger average cranial capacity than others from Egypt. In contrast, Egyptian skulls labeled by Morton (1849) as “negroid” (which he presumed to be of mixed ancestry) are not significantly different than non-“Pelasgic” skulls from the same localities. Moreover, actual re-measurements of the skulls in Morton’s collection by two different sets of investigators (Michael 1988; Lewis et al. 2011) are not consistent with Gould’s accusation of pervasive, unconscious bias. Lewis et al. (2011: 5) concluded that the “summary table of Morton’s final 1849 catalog ... has multiple errors .... However, had Morton not made those errors his results would have more closely matched his presumed a priori bias .... Ironically, Gould’s own analysis of Morton is likely the stronger example of a bias influencing results.”

Lewis et al. (2011) were obviously not arguing for any of the repugnant racial stereotypes favored by Morton. Instead, they took issue with Gould’s claim that Morton unconsciously manipulated his data to favor white supremacy. They did not discuss what the population-level differences in Morton’s data might mean. However, unlike Gould, Lewis et al. (2011) did cite past work on latitude and temperature (Beals et al. 1984) as a potential explanation. Gould (1996) gave examples from various 19th-century writings about changes in human skin color and character given extended periods of time in a non-native climate, and even had an index entry entitled “climate, racial differences attributed to”. However, he did not consider latitudinal variation in size, which by the 1970s was a reasonably well-established pattern (Rensch 1924, 1938; Mayr 1942, 1956; Lindsey 1966; Beals 1972), albeit with caveats about cause and effect (e.g., James 1970). Gould himself discussed examples of Bergmann’s rule in his 1977 book Ever Since Darwin and in a 1972 review paper on geographic variation. Gould and Johnston (1972) noted instances in the literature for latitudinal patterns consistent with Bergmann’s rule in birds, deer, and ticks, but not humans. They concluded that “we know that Bergmann’s rule governs the distribution of body size in many homeothermic species” (Gould and Johnston 1972: 488) and underscored the importance of quantification.

Yet Gould did not mention Bergmann’s rule as a potential factor behind human size variation in his 1978 paper, or in the 1981 or 1996 editions of The Mismeasure of Man. According to Gould, “Morton assumed that [cranial capacity indicates] an innate difference in intelligence. He never considered any other proposal for the disparity in average cranial capacity – though another simple and obvious explanation lay before him” (1996: loc.1403) which, according to Gould, was stature: “size of brains are related to the sizes of bodies that carry them”. In other words, differences in brain size are due to size. In an unusual lapse of curiosity, Gould (1996) did not proceed to ask why the “sizes of bodies” would themselves have varied across human populations, despite having noted the mechanism articulated by Bergmann (1848) in his own previous writings (e.g., Gould and Johnston 1972; Gould 1977).

Some later investigators (Weisberg 2014; Weisberg and Paul 2016; Mitchell and Michael 2019) have sought to validate Gould’s noble, egalitarian sentiment as expressed in The Mismeasure of Man by arguing that Gould’s central claim of Morton’s bias is still valid. All of these authors are correct to express disdain for Morton’s racism, which is amply demonstrated by his own publications; its recognition this does not require any reevaluation of Morton’s methods for collecting or analyzing data (Richards 2018). Perhaps more interestingly, it was not Morton but Gould who selectively presented his data to fit his preconceived bias (Lewis et al. 2011), i.e., that there should not be variation among human ethnic groups. Among these recent publications favorable to Gould, Weisberg (2014: 177) was among the few to mention Bergmann (1848) as relevant to human size variation, but still agreed with Gould that “there are no significant differences in mean cranial capacities across races in Morton’s collection”.

Templeton (1998, 2013) argued that, if “race” is supposed to mean a biological subspecies, then there are two main reasons why human “races” do not exist: 1) lack of genetic differentiation (i.e., F_st values below 0.25) and 2) the absence of a bifurcating, tree-like structure in the Pleistocene history of Homo sapiens. Compared to other primates, humans have relatively little genetic diversity (Osada 2015), and most diversity that does exist is distributed within human groups rather than between them (Barbujani et al. 1997). However, measuring human genetic diversity using F_st is complex and not well-suited to human geographic variability (Long and Kittles 2003; Roseman 2021). Edwards (2003) also criticized the use of F_st in assessing genetic diversity within and between human ethnic groups. However, unlike Long and Kittles (2003) and Roseman (2021), Edwards (2003) viewed the existence of those groups as at least partly coincident with their genetic differentiation. Perhaps more importantly, and regardless of how one interprets F_st (see Novembre 2022), Edwards (2003: 801) warned that “it is a dangerous mistake to premise the moral equality of human beings on biological similarity because dissimilarity, once revealed, then becomes an argument for moral inequality.” A similar point was made by Reich (2018: 257–258): “we should prepare our science and our society to be able to deal with the reality of differences [between human populations] instead of sticking our heads in the sand and pretending that differences cannot be discovered.” Both Edwards (2003) and Reich (2018) address an issue which is obfuscated by Gould and others who ignore or downplay variation between human groups: our “moral equality” (Edwards 2003: 801), i.e., our status as deserving of equality of opportunity and social justice, is contingent upon our shared dignity as human beings, not upon claims of phenotypic or genotypic sameness.

Less controversial is the understanding that the amount of genetic exchange among humans worldwide has been substantial for millennia (Templeton 2013; Reich 2018). Depictions of tree-like evolution among modern humans mask some of the recursive or “trellis”-like patterns that actually occurred (Templeton 2013: fig. 2). On this basis alone, humans cannot be legitimately categorized into taxonomic subspecies. Just as there is no evidence to partition human groups into biological subspecies, there is no evidence for claims of superiority of one ethnic group over another. This observation does not mean that human groups have to be phenotypically or genetically “equal”. In fact, a nuanced understanding of human diversity recognizes that “hereditary differences between human individuals are real and important, and there are significant average differences in various respects between some regional populations” (Cartmill 1998: 659). Such differences may result from non-random mating (Burrell and Disotell 2009) and subsequent departures from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium for certain genetic loci (Sebro et al. 2017). There are also minor differences in morphology between populations (Howells 1995; Ousley et al. 2009; Yong et al. 2018). Recognition of such population-level genetic or morphological differences does not imply approval of the term “race”, which carries with it many social and cultural factors that have little connection to biological heredity (Templeton 2013). Indeed, many authors (e.g., Cartmill 1998) have argued that the negative, sociocultural baggage of that term warrants its exclusion in discussions of human biological diversity.

According to Wagner et al. (2017), a majority (86%) of professional anthropologists disagreed with their survey question that “the human population may be subdivided into biological races” (Wagner et al. 2017: table 2, question #1), but there is less concordance on the relevance of geography to human variation, which does have a demonstrable association with indices of genetic and phenotypic distance (Manica et al. 2005, 2007). The anthropological community seems more divided regarding the survey question of Wagner et al. (2017: table 2, question #7) that “continental population categories – Africans, Asians, Europeans – are useful for examining genetic relationships (i.e., relatedness) among people”. 38% of surveyed anthropologists disagreed, but 33% agreed. Given its political baggage, “race” might therefore reasonably be replaced with alternatives such as “ethnic group” (Montagu 1964) or “phyle” (Sánchez-Villagra 2022).

All of these terms represent non-exclusive, relatively open units of gametic exchange across humanity. Whichever one is used, the challenge is to convey simply and uncontroversially the ways in which some human ethnic groups show, on average, significant differences from one another, including cranial size and shape. For example, Fuegian Patagonians have significantly larger cranial volumes than Papuans (Figure 3C). These groups exhibit substantially different histories and are clearly distinct ethnic groups, even though neither one (or any other two modern human populations) exhibits sufficient differentiation to qualify as distinct biological subspecies.

Gould (1978: 503) claimed that “When [Morton’s] data are properly reinterpreted, all [human] races have approximately equal capacities”. However, he did so not on the basis of craniometric data, but presumably due to his desire to support human equality in spite of persistent socioeconomic and political inequality. In fact, cranial capacities between several geographically distinct human groups – some of which are similar to the “races” of Tiedemann and Morton – are not “approximately equal” (Table 4). They are in terms of intellectual potential, but there are at least some phenotypic differences (Figure 3C, Table 4; see also, e.g., Howells 1995; Ousley et al. 2009; Yong et al. 2018). Ironically, Gould’s assertion about the variation of cranial capacity among humans, when shown to be false, may lead to skepticism about his other assertions, including the rightful pursuit of socioeconomic justice. Human populations should not have to be “approximately equal” in a phenotypic or genotypic sense to qualify for social justice or equality of opportunity.