Ashley on Gender Identity1
1 Pepperdine University;
2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
* Corresponding author:
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 28 Sep 2023 / Accepted: 9 Apr 2024 / Published: 29 Apr 2024
Abstract
‘Gender identity’ was clearly defined sixty years ago, but the dominant conceptions of gender identity today are deeply obscure. Florence Ashley’s 2023 theory of gender identity is one of the latest attempts at demystification. Although Ashley’s paper is not fully coherent, a coherent theory of gender identity can be extracted from it. That theory, we argue, is clearly false. It is psychologically very implausible, and does not support ‘first-person authority over gender’, as Ashley claims. We also discuss other errors and confusions in Ashley’s paper.
Keywords: gender identity; transgender; sex; gender; first-person authority
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
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CITE
Bogardus, T.; Byrne, A. Ashley on Gender Identity1. Controversial_Ideas 2024, 4, 2.
Bogardus T, Byrne A. Ashley on Gender Identity1. Journal of Controversial Ideas. 2024; 4(1):2.
Bogardus, Tomás; Byrne, Alex. 2024. "Ashley on Gender Identity1." Controversial_Ideas 4, no. 1: 2.
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